As the nation and much of the world mourns the death of President Jimmy Carter, the historic Camp David Accords he engineered in 1978 merit special attention.
Though Carter was more critical of Israel and supportive of Arabs than all other presidents, especially after he left office, he did more for the security of Israel than any American president other than Harry Truman, who first extended diplomatic recognition to the newborn nation in 1948.
Carter did more for the security of Israel than any American president other than Harry Truman.
Four times between 1948 and 1973, neighboring Arab states fought wars aimed at destroying Israel. In each of those wars, the strongest Arab military force by far — the only one capable of “driving Israel into the sea” in the common formulation of the day — was the Egyptian army. In 1979, Carter secured peace between Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and neither country has made war on the other since.
After Carter, 100, died Dec. 29, the current leaders of both nations expressed their appreciation for what the South Georgia peanut farmer with no foreign policy experience helped achieve more than 45 years ago.
The Camp David Accords and the treaty that resulted did more than save tens of thousands of Egyptian and Israeli lives; they dramatically reduced the odds of general war — even superpower confrontation — in the Middle East.
Decades later, Carter told me that his biggest regret about losing to Ronald Reagan in 1980 was that he didn’t get a chance to complete the unfinished business of Camp David — a comprehensive regional peace that included a Palestinian state.
It’s an improbable tale: a president educating himself in the nuances of the most complex conflict in the world, then — when history offers him the chance — defying his advisers and diving in head-first. His religious faith and long interest in “the holy land” fueled a risky but ultimately magnificent obsession, one that tested not just his prodigious diplomatic skills but every ounce of his patience. Carter’s often-derided attention to detail eventually made the difference.
Over the course of 13 days, the talks between Egypt and Israel repeatedly broke down. At one point, Sadat asked for a helicopter to take him immediately to the Washington airport. The Egyptians were all packed and ready to go.
His biggest regret about losing to Reagan was that he didn’t get to complete the unfinished business of Camp David — a comprehensive regional peace that included a Palestinian state.
Carter had to pull the emergency cord. He told Sadat that if he unilaterally broke off negotiations it would severely harm relations between Egypt and the United States, and Egypt would have to ally with the Soviet Union again. He said Sadat was “violating his personal promise to me” and damaging one of his most precious possessions — “his friendship and our mutual trust.”
To keep things light and social, Carter and Vice President Walter Mondale went to Sadat’s cottage to watch the Muhammad Ali-Leon Spinks heavyweight title fight. Sadat, a huge Ali fan, served them tea made from boiled mint and honey. He seemed calmer.
Carter told his wife, Rosalynn, that while parts of their time at Camp David had been “among the most unpleasant he had ever experienced in his life,” he knew there was no way either Begin or Sadat would have stayed were it not for him.
After several more bumps in the road and threats to leave, there came one of those human moments that so often determine the course of events. Ken Hays, the deputy chief of protocol, had earlier received a request from the Israeli delegation for signed presidential photographs for Begin’s grandchildren. Susan Clough, the president’s secretary, had the good sense to ask Hays to find out their names. Carter disliked autographing pictures and, according to Clough, he wasn’t in the mood for it. But he quickly agreed to his secretary’s suggestion that he personally walk the pictures over to Begin, who was preparing to leave, and he signed them with “Love and Best Wishes” instead of his standard “Best Wishes.”
Begin, in his cabin, received Carter coolly, but when he saw the kind inscription Carter had written for his granddaughter on the top photograph, he somberly spoke her name aloud and that of a couple of his other grandchildren, telling the president a bit about each. His lips trembled and his eyes filled with tears. So did Carter’s. He had hoped to write, “This is where your grandfather and I brought peace to the Middle East.”
Begin never said publicly that the individually inscribed photographs for his grandchildren influenced him, but Carter came to believe they were critical to the outcome.
A few minutes later, when the president learned that Begin had — for the first time — gone to Sadat’s cabin, he broke into a sprint to get there, concerned they might quarrel again. He ran into a happy Begin in a golf cart returning from what he described as a “love feast” with Sadat.
After 23 drafts, Begin was finally on board, showing what Carter called “a surprising flexibility that made it possible for us to achieve success.” Begin wrote no memoirs and never said publicly that the individually inscribed photographs for his grandchildren influenced him, but Carter came to believe they were critical to the outcome.
In the flush of triumph, Carter was much too optimistic about the chances of true regional peace. “If the Palestinian authority is well run and controls terrorism, it will be extremely difficult for Israel to slice away any significant territory after five years of Palestinian consolidation,” he wrote on the final day of the summit in a portion of his diary that he — not surprisingly — chose not to publish. “The process, if well-conducted, becomes virtually irreversible.”
As it turned out, the Palestinians did not “control terrorism,” the Israelis continued to “slice away” territory for their settlements, the peace process was not “well-conducted,” and there was nothing “irreversible” about it. In fact, Carter later recognized that Camp David may have inadvertently hurt the cause of a Palestinian state — a cause to which he would dedicate himself in the years ahead.
What he didn’t grasp then was that taking the Egyptian army off the table removed Egypt’s powerful military as a deterrent to Israel launching pre-emptive strikes against Palestinian fighters in Lebanon and other countries and to building many more settlements on the West Bank.
While Carter fell short of his dream of brokering a comprehensive regional settlement that produced a homeland for the Palestinians, his handiwork has remained remarkably intact — the most important and durable peace treaty anywhere in the world since the end of World War II.
This column was adapted from the author’s book “His Very Best: Jimmy Carter, a Life.”
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